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CHAPTER ONE 
Emotional functions of money 
Anca Carrington 
O f all the ways in which thinking about money can be approached, historical accounts have been, and remain, the most prolific. On this matter, De Quincey is mercilessly clear 
in spelling out the appeal of this solution: "Failing analytically to 
probe its nature, historically we seek relief to our perplexities by trac-
ing its origin" (1893, p: 43). Most books on money turn away from 
lUlease and unanswered questions, and embrace ins.tead classification 
and chronology (e.g., Eagleton & Williams, 2007). The majority of 
writers on this subject take great pleasure in listing the many forms in 
which money appeared over time, as it found itself embodied in coins 
Of shells, knives, salt, axes, skins, irOTI, rice, mahogany, tobacco, paper, 
and, more recently, plastic, and electronic impulses. Even the recently 
refurbished Money Room at the British Museum does not offer much 
more than a striking but brief succession of eras and currencies, one 
swift move from shells to plastic, as if to say, with a nod and a wink, 
"Isn't money odd?" Yet, as Buchan (1997) puts it, while money is "of 
no particular substance at all" (pp. 17-18), in any given medium, and 
at any given tiIne, money remains uincarnate desire" (p. 19), different 
and boundless for each person. It can at once convey and satisfy 
desire, even if only with a promise. Unlike other goods that can satisfy 
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one desire at a time, money confronts not just one single need alone, 
but Need itself (Schopenhauer, cited in Buchan, 1997, p. 31). 
Economics textbooks devote surprisingly little space to the nature 
of money, and focus instead on either elaborate policies that aim to 
manage money so that "more" takes the place of uless" in the relent-
less pursuit of economic growth, or complex financial techniques that 
can prove themselves so capable of generating such accumulation that 
little need for policy remains. As Galbraith (1975) rightly points out, 
"[T]he study of money, above all other fields in ecottomics, is the one 
where complexity is used to disguise the truth or to evade the truth, 
not to reveal it" (p. 15), conveying the all: of a Victorian novel about 
marriage that leaves out all mention of sex (Wiseman, 1974, p. 16). At 
the same time, as Buchan poignantly states, "whatever job it does, 
money does its job" (p. 182). 
In the limited economics textbook space devoted to what money is 
and what it does, one learns something about the roles of money, as 
manifested in its functioning as means of exchange, unit of ac~ount, 
store of value, and, in some books, and some of the time, standard of 
deferred payment. The economics vocabulary also includes the con-
cept of money illusion-not one usually uttered in public by policy 
makers. This refers to the tendency people have to think of money in 
nominal rather than in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Disputed by 
some in terms of how much a policy-maker can rely on this being the 
case, I find this concept a highly insightful one, as we all know some-
thing about regarding money as capable of offering more than it can 
actually purchase. 
I will explore each of the recognised functions of money in turn and 
posit that their universality and per~istence in the external econOlny 
can be lUlderstood in terms of the corresponding internal economy on 
which these external functions map and in which they are anchored. 
Money as means of exchange 
As a means of exchange, money relies. on its function as a measure of 
value, understood-in the vein of the prevailing rationalist view-as 
postulated on the basis of practical reason (Thomas, 2000). Money's 
ability to represent and measure value makes it a suitable device for 
separating the constraints of barter, where both parties must want the 
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goods of the other and be prepared to exchange theirs for it. Thus, the 
barter scenario is 
lhasA 
Jhas B 
I wants B 
J wants A 
I and J swap A and B 
I gets B 
J gets A. 
In the absence of money, I and J make either this transaction or none 
at all. By turning this dyad into a triangle, money makes it possible for 
the seller to turn buyer in a separate transaction, without being tied to 
what their buyer could offer. Thus; 
I has money 
I wants C 
Jhas C 
Jwants E 
I and J swap money and C 
I gets C 
J gets money 
J swaps money for E (latel; elsewhere). 
In day-to-day exchanges, money is an impersonal vehicle for 
hidden but highiy personal transactions, a mediator that provides the 
illusion of proximity without the cost of intimacy-it creates links 
with others, but not contact. A vivid depiction of this as-iE-ness in the 
world of business and economics is provided by Galbraith (1975) who 
reminds us that 
in monetary matters as in diplomacy, a nicely conformist nature, a 
good tailor and the ability to articulate the currently fashionable cliche 
have usually been better for personal success than an excessively 
inquiring mind. (p. 315) 
In this way, money functions as facilitator of transactions not 
only in our conscious reality, but also-and arguably more so-in 
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the unconscious domain, as what is being avoided on one level is 
constantly enacted on another. One's own relationship to money 
colours one's perception of how others might relate to it. It is on this 
level that money stands for what everyone desires, making any finan-
cial transaction a revolving Oedipal configuration, or what Green calls 
a "generalised triangulation with a substitutable third" (cited in Diat-
kine, 2007, p. 653). Having a lot of money can make one feel emotion-
ally wealthy, the chosen one, iterated winner of a life-long oedipal 
dispute. This is a common phantasy, shared by the economically poor 
and rich alike. Money offers the promise to alleviate castration anxiety 
for men: in phantasy, wealth becomes equated with Virility, making 
any woman accessible. For women, it can act as a means of denying the 
insurmountable gender divide, with the phallic woman either enjoy-
ing her experience of domination over the relatively poorer maTI, or 
feeling wary about putting suitors off by parading her status, under 
the spell of a powerful unconscious as.sociation between femininity 
and the tmderprivileged/castrated (Yablonsky, 1991). 
Each transaction offers a pair of a triangular configurations link-
ing, on the one hand, the seller, the buyer, and Inaney, where the 
desired object for the seller is money as mediator, and, on the other 
hand, the seller, ~he buyer, and the purchased goods or service, where 
the desired object for the buyer is the goods 01' service purchased. 'This 
triangular configuration is endlessly self-generating, with the buyer in 
one transaction becoming seller and buyer in many others, and like-
wise for the initial seller. 
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the seller I has Dj, which is the buyer 
I 
"/l~o 
/ 
Figure 1.1. The triangular transaction between a seller and a buyer, as mediated 
by money. 
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J's desired object. J give~ I money (m) in exchange for Dj and I is now 
free to pursue his Iher own desire, Di, through m. TIlls configuration 
extends in all direction, in an expanding beehive of transactions that 
constitute a sort of molecular structure of the world economy. 
Thus, each transaction offers the illusion of overcoming the oedi-
pal barrier: the buyer a at first) turns the inaccessible into accessible 
because slhe has the means (money) to get the desired object, with no 
obstacle in sight, as the rival (I) can be bought off and, thus, elimi-
nated; the seller (I) acquires the means (money) that offers the promise 
of accessing his or her desired object in any future transaction with, 
say, K, as well as a replenishment of virility. As Yablonsky (1991) 
explores in detail, "both sexes are responsible for the perpetration of 
this money Ivirility myth" (p. 33). 
If we were to apply this configuration to the payment of fees in 
psychoanalysis, it is easy to see how the patient bypasses others in the 
analyst's life by paying for the analytic hour, accessing in this way-
albeit temporarily-the dual relationship of phantasy; at the same 
time, the analyst gives up the hour, and other pursuits of desire that 
continue to exist beyond the confines of the session. An element of 
residual frustration about the limited power of money to secure 
such exclusivity characterises all transactions, but, in the particular 
exchange of therapy, this can be, and often is, addressed and explored. 
Money as unit of account 
As unit of account, money acts as a standardised unit of measurement 
across transactions. In the examples above, A, B, and so on had their 
own monetary value, meA), m(B), etc. In the case of barter, 
lhasA 
Jhas B 
I wants B 
J wants A 
I and J swap A and B 
I gets B 
J gets A, 
we could argue that I values B more than J does, and J values A more 
I, 
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than I does. When they make the exchange, each makes a gain by 
obtaining something they value more than what they had to start 
with. With money in place, 
I has money 
I wants C 
Jhas C 
Jwants E 
I and J swap money and C 
I gets C 
J gets money 
J swaps money for E (later, elsewhere), 
the buyer I pays m(C), some of which is then turned later by J into 
m(E). Although I parts with m(C) and J parts with C, arguably I values 
C more than m(C) in order to pursue the exchange. The same is true 
for J and his desired object,E. Also, J also values m(C) more than C, 
parting with C for the money that can be then used to obtain E. 
Economics alone would propose that A=B in barter or C=m(C) in 
the money economy, or else the first exchange either would not take 
place, or an adjustment would occur in the prices and/or quantities 
until the exchange can occur in the moneyed economy. M)C argument 
is that it is the added internal sense of value and emotional investment 
(cathexis) that makes such exchanges worth pursuing. In other words, 
desire. Something about exchange and personal value attributed to 
goods or services is dealt with in mainstream economics, ironically 
enough using the concept of "indifference curves" to capture an 
assumed equivalence of preferences for the same level of "utility", Yet, 
the entire exercise is as far from indifference as it can be, and definitely 
not purely utilitarian. 
The one domalll where the experience of this exchange has been the 
most explored psychoanalytically is that of the financial transactions 
between therapist and patient, around the issue of psychoanalytic fees 
and their payment in private practice. The focus of this literature is 
rather narrow, as it remains dominated by a specific set 
of themes: the presence or absence of fees and their the impact on 
the analytic experience (mostly in terms of associated resistance 
patterns), the level of fees and its relationship to the patient's financial 
circumstances (from very poor to extremely wealthy), change in the 
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financial circUTI1stances of the patient during analysis, and changing 
the level of fees, payment for missed sessions, missed payment} and 
the collection of debt, payment by third parties, and the mechanics of 
the monetary transactions between patient and therapist (see Krueger,· 
1986 for a comprehensive coverage of these issues). Underpinning 
these themes is an unspoken assumption that the patient is endlessly 
fragile on all matters related to money and that, somehow, the inlpact 
of this on the analysis should be minimised rather than this being, 
alongside everything else, open to questioning and enquiry. By impli-
cation, analysts themselves are assumed'to be invulnerable to such 
matters. Against the background of a detailed overview of these 
themes, Eissler (1974) recognises, with some degree of timidity, that 
analysts themselves Ca:tn1ot always keep their own attitudes towards 
money free from "irrational infusion" and that "a veil of unintended 
secrecy" covers the triangular formation of the analyst, fee, and 
patient. Also, m passing, he notes that psychoanalysis itself evolved, in 
historico-sociological terms, in conjunction with finance capitalism, 
offering, as it were, something from and for the wealthy and the upper 
middle class. Although he does not explore the consequences of this, it 
is as if he offers a possible explanation for the persistent reluctance in 
the profession to question this very history and its possible meaning. 
Famously labelled by Krueger (1986) as "the last emotional taboo" 
(p. vii), the issue of money m psychoanalysis retains the quality of a 
"fiscal blind spot" (Weissberg, 1989). What seems to complicate the 
matter and compromise the availability of ordinary psychoanalytic 
thinking and insight is the very economic dependence of therapists 
on their patients. It is interesting to note that the decade that gener-
ated a wave of publications deploring "the striking paucity of discus-
sions about the meaning of money" (Rothstem, 1986, p. 299) in 
psychotherapy was the 1980s, a time of visible increase in wealth and 
disparities m the western world, where the open and aggressive pur-
suit of money was a defining feature of society. It was as if the analytic 
profession was both wishing to catch up with this wave, and resent-
ful of being unable to, because of the bounds that the nature of their 
work imposed on them. Perhaps it is no coincidence for this book to 
mark a return to thinldng psychoanalytically about money, at a time 
when the recent global financial crises have left none of us unaffected 
and money has returned as cause for concern, this time provoking 
with its fragility rather than its promising abundance. 
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The recurrent discussion around the setting of the level of fees and 
their possible adjustment in relation to the patient's financial circtun-
stances reveals something about the lack of clarity and the discomfort 
some therapists have around the value they place on their own time 
and skills, especially as the issue of fees is also absent from most train-
ings (Lasky, 1984; Shields, 1996), thus perpetuating an avoidant 
stance. This resonates with Yablonsky's (1991) finding that the posi-
tions of entrepreneur and helper that psychotherapists find them-
selves in are often in conflict, whereby (fAn inner tug of war ensues 
between idealism and humanitarianism on the one hand and materi-
alism on the other" (p. 158), or what Krueger (1986) describes as "the 
antipodes of altruism and self-interest" (p. ix). Liss-Levinson (1990) 
proposes that this problem is more pronounced in the case of women 
analysts, who struggle more than men with the tension between the 
needs of the self and the needs of the other, as she explores findings 
that, overall, women analysts have lower fees. 
Furthermore, as Freud (1917e) has famously put it, "People never 
willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a 
substitute is already beckoning to them" (p. 244). This offers insight 
into money's attractiveness as an element of continuity, as well as into 
the asymmetric way in which we perceive a gain and a loss of equal 
monetary value. As a simple illustration, note the common experience 
of unease and disorientation that using foreign currency triggers, as 
well as the underlying belief of the traveller of "his own money at. 
home to be privileged and natural and all others to be departures from 
it,as all languages from his mother tongue" (Buchan, 1997, p. 190). 
It is, I hope, becoming clearer how money is not only the currency 
of our daily shopping, but also that of daily complex and mostly 
hidden emotional transactions. The functions it performs in the exter-
nal economy have their internal, unconscious counterpart, and the 
experience of each individual transaction links in complex ways with 
a shared and tmspoken space of symbolism and meaning. The sym-
bolic function of money has long been recognised. Buchan quotes 
Hodges, an eighteenth-century English historian, who, in 1697, con-
veyed this very idea succinctly and with poetic beauty: 
The value of money has been settled by general consent to express our 
wants and our property, as letters were invented to express our ideas; 
and both these inventions, by giving more active energy to the powers 
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and passions of human nature, have contributed to multiply the 
objects they were designed to represent. (1997, p. 20) 
The world of money has become increasingly one of endless oscil-
lation between continuity and discontinuity, shaped by divisibil-
ity, fungibility, and countability, whereby things can be turned into 
fractions, exchanged for each other, can be separated at one time 
and brought together at another, done and undone, damaged and 
repaired. This is very much the landscape of the internal phantasy, 
where whole and part-objects reside, where transformations have the 
fluidity of dream, yet true change can be avoided and repetition with-
out alteration is possible, alive, and endl~ss. 
Economists use the label of "purchasing power" to designate the 
amount of real goods and services that can be bought with each unit 
of money (Black, 1997, p. 381), but it is the power of money in phan-
tasy, with its quality of omnipotence, that gives it such unshakeable 
importance in our lives. 
Money as store of value 
As the world economy hovers on either side of the official definition 
of recession, the media abounds with stories of staggering lottery 
wins. I find that, at my current pay rate, close to the UK average in 
2011, I would need to work 2,187 years to earn as much as one such 
recently claimed and publiCised prize. On the same front page of this 
"free" London daily (Metro, 10 February 2012), one finds an article 
about the lead actor in the Harry Potter films, a series that has earned 
150 times more than the lottery win on which my first calculation was 
based. The twenty-two-year-old is quoted as saying, "Money? It does 
not motivate me." I ask myself, what does this mean? About my sense 
of value? Freedom? Desire? Hope? Tolerance? And, likewise, about 
his. 
De-materialisation moved money into a territory where everything 
is possible. Now, money exists in the overlapping zone between real 
and symbolic, in the ordinary rather than the Lacanian sense, where a 
great degree of cross-contamination is both possible and invited. This 
is the place where the symbolic can be treated as real, and the real as 
symbolic. To illustrate the former, think of how money continued to 
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perform its task long after the gold parity was eliminated and the 
printed paper issued by banks stopped having its touchable counter-
par~ in some inaccessible but existing vault. To visualise the latter, 
thlnk of how the power of mathematical artefacts applied to virtual 
money ruled in the run-up to the latest financial crisis and still defines 
job descriptions for well-paid jobs in the undeterred world of finance. 
Indeed, the latest addition to the monetary domain, the Bitcoin, is "a 
new specie" (The Economist, 2013a), a purely mathematically gener-
ated, decentralised digital currency, underpinned By peer-to-peer 
computer networking rather than by a central monetary authority 
(The Economist, 2013b). 
This particular aspect, of the role of the issuing authority in estab-
lishlng the credibility and validity of money; carries great weight in 
the symbolic domain-understood in both the ordinary and the 
Lacanian senses. The right to issue money is a highly privileged one, 
the entitlement of kings and, more recently, the state. Indeed, the 
economic concept of seigniorage captures something of this archaic but 
powerful order, as it refers to a source of revenue based on the very 
right to issue money, and is defined as "The profits made by a ruler 
from issuing money", and related originally to "the profits from the 
issue of coinage with a face value greater than its cost of production" 
(Black, 1997, p. 421). In other words, it is the economic measure of the 
power of law invested in the issuing authority. 
In the Oedipus myth itself, the killed father is no ordinary man, 
but the king-presumably the richest man in the land. Taking his 
life means not only taking his wife, but also the accompanying 
material riches, including the right to issue money, one would imag-
ine. This aspect olthe myth remains as powerful as the rest. Schlnd-
ler (1983) proposes that money is "frequently in the eyes of the child 
a sign of father's omnipotence" and that economic development 
"is influenced to a great extent by the father-son relationship as 
part of the Oedipus complex" (p. 72). Tracking the evolution of values 
in sOciety, Saroldi (2002) deplores the current era, where she perceives 
that "the function of the father as Lawgiver is supplanted by the 
function of money as the only value and measure of all things" 
(p.209). 
The boundary between the symbolic and the real domain is a 
porous one, fizzy with constant movement. -As Buchan (1997) beauti-
fully puts it, 
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Money is one of those human creations that make concrete a sensation, 
in this case the sensation of wanting, as a clock does the sensation of 
passing time. It is that double aspect of money, ahy and substantial, 
that fascinated all civilisations. (p. 269) 
11 
The porosity of this barrier is what made possible the emergence and 
acceptance of increasingly sophisticated financial products, invested 
from the start with attributes of a phantastic object (see Chapter Four). 
Before moving deeper into the internal economy, a quick return to 
money in its old-fashioned, mat€1;ial manifestations. Coins and bank-
notes out of circulation return, after a vrhile, to the realm of commod-
ity, and become subject to transaction like any other historical objects, 
joining the circuit of antiques and collectables, old money changing 
hands for new, dead currency swapping place with living currency at 
auctions, gathered and dispersed again by collectors and specialist 
traders. Left outside this circuit, obsolete money fades relentlessly into 
uselessness, as Buchan (1997) vividly conveys as he reminisces about 
banknotes he kept in a drawer after they went out of circulation: "I 
kept them because I sensed their value evaporating, their moneyness 
seeping into the old satlnwood, till they were just coloured paper you 
couldn't even write on" (p. 12). 
Banknotes currently in circulation, once they become worn out or 
damaged, retire and get turned into briquettes used as agricultural 
compost (BBC, 2012), an aptly Freudian exit. One of the arguments 
put forward in the same radio show was that we believe in money 
because it works. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition. The con-
verse, that money works because we believe in it or, rather, does not 
when we do not believe in it becomes most apparent during every 
financial crisis. The recent one has brought a real change to all of us: 
an increase in wealth to a few, a loss of assets and increase in debt and 
hopelessness to most, but also a symbolic change, as the eVer-crum-
bling trust in the euro between 2010 and 2012 shows. Like unappeased 
gods, the markets demolished by night what Brussels policy-makers 
!tied to put back together by day. It might well be that the fragility of 
. the trust in this particular project, of the new European currency, 
stems .in part from our witnessing its creation, from it being not so 
much an inherited myth, but one we watched being put together and 
failed to believe in as a consequence. 
Berger (1972) provides a poignant emotional definition of money: 
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Money is life. Not in the sense that without money you starve. Not in 
the sense that capital gives one class power over the entire lives of 
another dass. But in the sense that monel) is a token of, and the key to, 
every human capacity. The power to spend money is the power to live. 
According to the legends of publicity, those who lack the power to 
spend money become literally faceless. Those who have the power 
become lovable. (p. 137, my italics) 
On a psychic level, money stores not any odd value, but that of our 
very existence. As the money phantasies explored by Wiseman (1974) 
show, we use it as both a defence against the pain of not feeling loved, 
and as means of punishlng those whose desire rests elsewhere. Where 
the punishment of others takes the form of attacks in phantasy on the 
internal objects, money offers the solution by facilitating buying as an 
act of reparation. In this sense, money is not just a store of value, but 
a restorer if it. Furthermore, as the exploration of childhood phan-
tasies in Chapter Three shows, money is invested early on with the 
power to negotiate an easy bypassing of emotional deprivation and 
loss and to allow the acquisition in phantasy of what is painfully lack-
ing in reality. The geometry of the oedipal configuration, with its 
negotiation by external transactions, is in place almost from the start. 
What becomes of this in adult life is well captured in a story that 
shimmers with the richness of this interplay between the individual 
and the collective and between the symbolic and the real,-Mark 
Twain's story of 1893, "The £1,000,000 bank-note", first published in 
1893. (The Bank of England has, in fact, been using £1 million notes 
since the eighteenth century for the purpose of internal accounting. 
The entrance to the Bank of England Museum is adorned with an 
oversized such banknote, signed by the Queen in December 2012, 
presumably not for accounting purposes, but as a display of what 
power and authority can achieve with its stamp even in times of finan-
cial crisis.) 
In Twain's story, the protagonist, following a bet between rich men, 
unknown to him, is given just such an extraordinary banknote to 
spend. Nobody is in a position to give him the change to any of his 
purchases, so they sell him everything on credit, expecting future 
payment which, they believe, a man of his means could not fail to 
make. Without spending any actual money, the previously destitute 
man, buys food and sheltel; and, most of all; a reputation for wealth-
which he can even lend to friends by vouching for their business 
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reliability-and, ultimately, a wife. What is most remarkable in this 
short and entertaining tale is the clarity with which the impact of 
money (both actual and potential, both real and imaginary) has on 
how the character sees himself and is seen by others. His bewilder-
ment and struggle to stick to what he knew of hlinself from before is 
at odds with how others see him, which is almost exclusively through 
this extraordinary and external aspect of his circumstances. But even 
the main character himself, who remains nameless throughout, 
becomes gradually unable to see his own identity other than as 
defined by the way he responds to the surprising circumstances he 
finds himself in. Money becomes a sort of double-sided mirror that 
reflects any interaction he has with himsr;!lf and with others, whether 
they know the story behind his extraordinary fortune or not. While, in 
a sense, the sudden riches are not real, once they are accepted as such, 
h~ becomes able to get involved in real business and accumulate real 
earnings. The promise of money generates more money, and credit is 
entirely dependent on the strength of the shared belief and conven-
tion. 
That this is still the case more than 100 years on is well captured 
by ZiZek's (2009) analysis of the global response to the financial crisis 
that defined the first decade of the twenty-first century: 
let us not forget that the sublim~ly enormous sums of money were 
spent not on some clear 'real' or concrete problem, but essentially in 
order to restore confidence in the markets, that is, simply to change 
people's beliefs. (p. 80) 
In a sense, the need to sustain a symbol becomes more real than the 
reality of other, arguably fundamental, needs. The price is a high one, 
as $318 was spent on buying trust at a time of financial crisis in 2009 
for every $1 spent on alleviating famine, which affeeled close to one 
billion people in 2010 (World Hunger Education Service, 2013). In the 
case of the lengthy euro crisis that marked this decade, over one tril-
lion euro (Le., 1,000 billion, or £847 billion) had been spent by the 
European Central Bank on "saving the euro" by February 2012 (Eve-
ning Standard, 2012), compared to an annual European budget of fifty 
billion euro for international aid, so a ratio of a 20:1 between belief and 
starvation. Zizek (2009) links money to the relationship between 
symptom and fetish, where the former is the place where the 
repressed erupts, while the latter functions as "the embocliment of the 
~tl ~~ 
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lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth" (p. 65), in the 
split between disavowed beliefs and a remainder reality that, thus, 
becomes bearable. 
Money as a standard of deferred payment 
As a standard of deferred payment, money is the accepted way of 
settling a debt and the unit in which this debt is denominated. The 
advent of credit, replacing metal with faith, enhanced, rather than 
diminished, the place of money in the domain of desire and phantasy. 
This was recognised and articulated by Hodges, who explains that the 
whole Value that is put upon Money by Mankind, speaking generally, 
is extrinsick to the Money, and hath its real seat in those good things, 
through the Estimation providentially put upon it, which it is capable 
to purchase. (1697, p. 147, cited in Buchan, 1997, p. 104) 
Yet, less than a hundred years latet; Adam Smith, founding father of 
economics, as he is known, disregarded the place of emotions where 
money is concerned and asserted that what it conveys is not wishes, 
but thoughts, and that people pursue, accumulate, and spend money 
under the guide of rationality and always with benign effects. (The 
wish within the discipline of economics to be taken seriously and 
regarded as a science was such that "[i]n the two centuries after Smith, 
more mental effort was wasted objectifying his system of belief than 
on any other in history, not excluding the immortality of the soul and 
the rentability of civilian nuclear power" (Buchan, 1997, p. 178).) 
Rationality is fighting its own battle in economics, where too 
many challenges to it have now been raised to be ignored-see, for 
example, the Institute for New Economic Thinking, !NET (http://inet 
economics,org/) for the new home of economics, one hopes not in 
exile, 
One much deferred payment was that of attention to the issue of 
money in the internal world and the relationship this bears to the 
external one, in which this book itself aims to become an object of 
desire and be sold at a price, so that the authors themselves can be 
freed to pursue other de~ires of their own. Far from being the last 
psychoanalytic word on money, this is, rathel; intended as the begin-
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ning of a rigorous debate that is asking to take shape and to which 
psychoanalytic thinking can make a unique contribution. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Freud's papers on money 
Anca Carrington 
Introduction 
F reud's seminal paper of 1908(b) is a short contribution, a "communication", as he describes it, rooted in clinical observa-tion rather than in theoretical preconception. Yet, the argument 
is sketchy and remains unsubstantiated by clinical material, in a way 
that gives it the quality of a note to himself, but one that he was in a 
hurry to share with his readers. Something about this rushed quality 
might be understood in terms of his own personal unease around 
money. Warner (1989) explores Freud's pel'sonall'elationship to money, 
his struggle to manage his financial responsibility, his inclination to 
borrow more m~mey than he repaid, his resenhnent towards being in 
debt, as well as his discomfort at the thought of poverty, linked, as this 
was, in his mind with his father's "generous improvidence" (p. 609). 
There is something about this personal dimension, about this apparent 
mix of deprivation and entitlement, that perhaps made it difficult for 
Freud to retain his usual inquisitiveness around difficult questions, 
and prevented him from becoming more involved psychoanalytically 
with money and its role in the unconscious. The review of Freud's 
correspondence, and of the subsequent literature on the fortunes of the 
